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Local Governments and Primary 
Education in Uganda
Emilly Comfort Maractho*
Abstract Decentralisation was one of the major reforms in the 1990s in 
Uganda, geared towards improving democratic governance and service 
delivery. However, districts have had variable performance, especially in 
providing primary education through public schools. In this article, I ask 
what explains the difference in local governments’ performance across 
two districts that were given similar powers and share a similar history. 
I explore this through in-depth interviews in the two districts and find that 
local governments are severely constrained in their performance by a lack 
of funds, which, along with development priorities, are controlled by the 
central government. Within this scenario, variable performance is explained 
to a great extent by the presence of donors and investments by the private 
sector, but that these funds are attracted to areas where greater capacity 
exists. While this improves education performance, it can contribute to 
growing inequality in educational attainment across districts.
Keywords: decentralisation, Uganda, service delivery, primary education, 
donors.
1 Introduction
The main legal framework for Uganda’s current local governments is 
the Decentralisation Statute 1993, aimed to transfer power to the people 
and promote equitable distribution of  resources. The 1995 constitution 
detailed the modalities of  a decentralised government while the Local 
Governments Act of  1997 made Local Government Council responsible 
for ensuring implementation and compliance with government policies 
(GoU 1997). According to Saito (2003: 203), ‘Uganda today probably 
has the most elaborate legal framework for decentralising measures 
in Africa and is firmly committed to decentralisation. The amount of  
financial resources transferred to local governments is one of  the largest 
in Africa’. Whereas it can be argued that the amounts of  financial 
resources transferred are significant, what really matters is whether these 
financial resources have over the years translated to effective service 
delivery as promised in the decentralisation objectives.
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One of  the areas of  transfer of  power is primary education, which 
became the responsibility of  local governments after decentralisation. 
The Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme was introduced 
in 1997, becoming part of  the mandate of  local governments. While 
initially the policy was to target four children per household, it later 
expanded to include all school-aged children. The reform led to the 
empowerment of  ordinary Ugandans and improved implementation and 
monitoring of  primary education (Mukunya 2007: 233). There was initial 
excitement about the policy as Ugandans would for the first time access 
free education (Buwembo 2016). Within this plan, local governments 
were to be responsible for education planning and management, school 
inspections, teacher management and classroom construction.
Almost two decades later, there is growing public concern over the 
quality of  service delivery by local governments. Existing research 
shows that local government delivery failures are connected to a host 
of  factors, including multiple leadership conflicts across different tiers 
of  government, low levels of  revenue collection and limited financial 
autonomy, distortions inherent in the decentralisation policy, and 
central government’s control of  the national budget resources (ACODE 
2014: 3). Yet, not all local governments are performing badly. Some 
local governments are able to perform well in delivering their functions 
as per their mandate while others are not (ACODE 2014). What are the 
reasons for this differential performance?
Using the two cases of  Arua and Nebbi districts in the West Nile 
region, I examine reasons for differences in performance across two 
areas with similar history, geography and powers. The question I pose 
is: What factors explain the difference in local government performance across 
two districts that were given similar powers? The outcome I consider here is 
local government performance in service delivery and the factors that 
account for variations in outcomes. An analysis of  the two cases leads 
to the finding that in the case of  primary education – a key mandate of  
local government – external factors such as private sector engagement 
and donor involvement contribute to the difference in performance.
For the past 15 years, there have been several studies on Uganda’s 
decentralisation, local government and service delivery (Saito 2003, 
2006; Golooba-Mutebi 2004, 2006; Uwezo Uganda 2016; Green 
2010, 2013; ACODE 2014). While these have largely focused on 
the challenges of  decentralisation or its impact on specific service 
delivery and popular participation, they left unexplained most of  the 
reasons for variations in outcomes and why some districts emerge as 
‘islands of  effectiveness’. While concurring with Crook (2010) that 
lack of  organisational commitment is a key variable to explain why 
some districts underperform, I contend that this gets exacerbated in 
contexts where local governments have little capacity to deliver services, 
limited financial autonomy and decision-making powers, and remain 
dependent on central government, with their powers limited to legal 
frameworks only. Comparing the two districts of  Arua and Nebbi allows 
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us to make some propositions in terms of  which other factors account 
for these variations.
This study thus examines why there are variations in local government 
performance in service delivery when local governments have similar 
powers, and face similar challenges vis-à-vis the central government. This 
article is organised as follows. In the next section, I revisit decentralisation in 
Uganda, focusing ultimately on service delivery, and in particular, primary 
education. In Section 3, I explain the rationale for the use of  comparative 
analysis in my methodology, and in Section 4, I analyse the two cases. In 
Section 5, I present the key reasons for variations in performance across the 
two cases, before concluding with policy implications in Section 6.
2 The promise and reality of decentralisation in Uganda
Uganda’s decentralisation and its extensive legal framework is 
considered impressive on the African continent, and represents ‘a radical 
reengineering of  the mechanisms of  governance towards political, 
administrative and fiscal devolution’ (Steffensen 2006: 93). ‘What is 
beyond dispute […] is that Uganda’s local government reforms in the 
last 20 years count among the most ambitious and arguably the most 
successful on the African continent’ (Golooba-Mutebi 2006: 61). This 
claim of  success in comparison to decentralised systems in Africa is 
difficult to make today in light of  service delivery challenges in local 
government districts that are commonplace in the media and in debates 
about decentralisation. A recent television discussion, one of  many 
commentaries, debated the relevance of  decentralisation. The debate, 
entitled ‘Is Decentralisation Dead?’, led to an open questioning of  the 
usefulness of  decentralisation today among participants of  the show 
(People’s Parliament on NTV), who are Ugandan citizens from all walks 
of  life. Throughout the dialogue, various participants echoed ongoing 
popular debates by affirming that Uganda’s decentralisation was 
ineffective and was doing little to improve service delivery, which has 
been the main objective of  the reforms all along. Members of  various 
local governments invited for the show expressed concern over how the 
decentralisation policy has evolved over the years, wondering if  it still 
existed. This questioning is not limited to citizen participation on national 
media, but also research has indicated that decentralisation is in trouble. 
Green (2013) discusses the rise and fall of  decentralisation, in which he 
argues that much of  the initial gains of  the 1990s have not been matched 
in recent years and excitement about programmes has tapered off.
Decentralisation in Uganda happened within larger economic 
reforms driven by neoliberalism and structural adjustment policies 
that prioritised the role of  the market and private actors. As a result, 
while services like primary education delivery were transferred to 
local governments, this process was implemented through a system 
of  partnerships with the private sector and other development actors 
that reduced the role of  the local state as the primary provider. This is 
evident in the way that government documents differentiate between 
service delivery and service provision:
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Service provision refers to the whole process of  planning public 
services while service delivery refers to mechanisms of  policy 
implementation. In Uganda’s local government system, service 
delivery approaches include: direct provision by the local 
government, public–private partnerships (PPPs), participation of  civil 
society (CSOs) and privatization (GoU 2013: 10).
Any assessment of  local government performance must inherently 
take into account all of  these elements rather than focus on the one 
approach of  direct provision. The government of  Uganda perceived 
many benefits of  decentralising education service delivery, including 
the elimination of  what it saw as unnecessary bureaucratic channels; 
reduction of  corruption; increased level of  monitoring; management of  
the education system according to local priorities; improved financial 
accountability; and increased local revenue to fund services (Namukasa 
2007). Empirical evidence on how things have worked out, however, 
is mixed. Decentralisation opened the way for more realistic planning 
and mobilisation of  resources (Mukunya 2007) and brought significant 
improvements in service delivery (Katono 2007; Ssemakula 1996). The 
purported significant improvements in service delivery now remain 
under question in light of  new developments such as the impulsive 
creation of  new districts that are deemed unviable for service delivery, 
but formed in the spirit of  political patronage as compensation for 
lost reforms (Green 2010) with full knowledge of  their political and 
economic limitations (Green 2013).
In addition, a number of  issues have created hindrances to positive 
results. These include lack of  human and social capital; local power 
structures obstructing citizen participation; public disinterest in payment 
of  taxes if  not accompanied by improved services; and an inability of  
the state to effectively involve civil society (Saito 2003) and what has been 
termed an obsessive creation of  districts (Green 2010). Dependence of  
local governments on the central government, limited autonomy, and 
limited community participation in local government decision-making 
processes (Nkalubo 2007) are some of  the other limitations.
Evidence from the annual reports series, Are Our Children Learning? 
(Uwezo Uganda 2011) and from local government scorecards 
(ACODE 2014) seem to confirm this discouraging perspective in 
the area of  service delivery and in particular primary education 
provision. According to an analysis of  the last 2016 Uwezo report, 
60 per cent of  P.3–P.71 pupils attending private schools could read and 
understand a P.2 English story and P.2 maths division while 49 per 
cent of  P.3–P.7 pupils attending government schools could read and 
understand the same work (Nassaka 2016: 17). All six reports Uwezo 
have released so far indicate that the quality of  education within the 
UPE framework, which is the direct provision option, is something the 
government needs to be concerned about, with persistent low learning 
outcomes. The same report indicates that the performance based 
on districts reflects regional inequalities. All the ten best performing 
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districts were from central and south-west Uganda while all the ten 
worst performing districts were from the East, North and West Nile 
regions (Uwezo Uganda 2016). Despite this gloomy outlook, rankings 
such as these of  Uwezo, based on primary education, and ACODE, 
based on performance of  local government in various social service 
delivery areas, indicate that there are variations in outcomes, with some 
performing well and others dismally. What is also crucial is that some of  
these variations fit within regional inequalities identified previously.
3 Research design: comparative case study method
This study is based in the West Nile region of  Uganda. Largely rural, 
among the poorest in the country, and with literacy rates below national 
averages, this region’s limited access to government services – due to its 
remoteness, a history of  war, and a continuing lack of  community voice 
– makes for an interesting case (AFARD 2011: 4). The West Nile’s level 
of  relative deprivation in comparison to other regions of  Uganda means 
that if  we can find pockets of  better performance here, we may be able to 
identify the factors that can work to raise the quality of  service delivery.
The West Nile today consists of  eight district local governments, with 
Arua and Nebbi districts lying in the North-Western corner of  Uganda. 
Both partly border the Democratic Republic of  Congo and Arua also 
borders South Sudan. Both cases were selected primarily because they 
were the only two of  West Nile’s eight districts that were assessed as part 
of  the most recent round of  the Local Government Councils Scorecard 
Assessment (LGCSCA) 2013/14 (ACODE 2014). They make an 
interesting pair for comparison because they are similar in many ways. 
They are contiguous districts that share a common history – together 
they formed the West Nile district before independence (Karibwije 
2005) – which allows us to hold most social and cultural practices 
constant. They also received full district status at the same time in 1980, 
and have similar local government powers.
Yet, though they lie close together, they have had divergent outcomes 
in social service delivery. The local government performance in service 
delivery is measured by three indicators, namely primary education 
(including both private and public schools), primary health services, and 
water and sanitation services. The performance of  primary education 
is also measured by three indicators, namely the net enrolment ratio, 
completion rate and the Primary Leaving Examination Performance 
Index.2 Nebbi was among the worst performing districts in primary 
education delivery, ranking 6th from the bottom out of  a total of  
30 districts, while Arua ranked 12th from the bottom. While exploring 
Arua’s performance allows us to look into an ‘island of  effectiveness’ 
(Crook 2010), Nebbi allows us to look into complexities of  local 
government service delivery.
I used the comparative method of  difference to study these two districts, 
based on the fact that they are similar in many ways that matter for 
the delivery of  primary education – such as the power and functions 
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of  district governments, revenues transferred to them by the central 
government, capacity for revenue mobilisation to complement service 
delivery, quality of  school teachers, shared history of  deprivation, 
formerly a single local government unit and school infrastructure – 
but which have different outcomes, with Arua performing better than 
Nebbi in the delivery of  primary education. I use local government 
performance in service delivery because they present the divergence 
in outcome between the districts relevant for interrogating issues of  
variation in outcome. This design allows us to explore both cases in 
detail to see what might be causing the difference in performance.
I made use of  secondary data and media reports to establish the nature 
of  allocation to education and to examine local government role in 
primary education in both districts, including on primary education 
performance in Nebbi and Arua. I strengthened this with carefully 
selected interviews in both districts. I conducted in-depth interviews 
with 12 purposively selected key players, people who worked in the 
education department, council and office of  the chief  administrative 
officer. At the district level, I interviewed senior staff at the education 
office, chief  administrative offices, and local councils. The choice of  
these key informants is based on their role in the district, specifically in 
planning and management of  education services.
4 Local government capacity in primary education delivery in the 
West Nile region
Local governments, and in particular district councils, have the power 
to deliver primary education services in Uganda with ‘overall control 
over the expenditure on services for which they were responsible’ 
(Golooba-Mutebi 2004). Their roles include inspection of  schools, 
funding, management of  teachers, school administration and planning, 
and school construction (Saito 2003). However, transfer of  responsibility 
is not synonymous with capacity. As Widmalm (2008: 44) reminds us, 
‘[T]he fact that responsibilities are given to a certain institution does not 
mean that the institution in question has the capacity to fulfil them… 
[nor] any possibility of  influencing the method of  implementation of  
the duties for which it is made responsible’. Capacity, be it human, 
financial and infrastructural, is crucial. The lack of  capacity to deliver 
has raised questions about the effectiveness of  decentralisation in 
Uganda. For instance, a respondent in Nebbi3 who coordinates a local 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) argued:
What I don’t agree with most is the word decentralisation… It is only the 
word itself, but there is no practice called decentralisation in Uganda. They say 
power belongs to the people, that now they have transferred every responsibility 
to people to make their plans. If  you go to the school and look at their plans, you 
will see that their plans are excellent, but now the funds are not controlled by the 
school, the funds are controlled by the centre at the district level… You cannot 
decentralise power when there is no money. There should be money and also 
power to plan.
(Endnotes)
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For others, such as a member of  the local government in Nebbi, the 
problem is more to do with how decentralisation has evolved:
Decentralisation would have added value if  every stakeholder was playing their 
role, because I think decentralisation says manage your own issues. Where you 
think the classrooms are not enough, put them there… but you know now there 
are some things that stakeholders have to do themselves to better this education. 
If  it is not being done, we are not going to blame decentralisation.
Particular to the case of  primary education, local governments are 
directly responsible not only for the delivery of  primary education 
within the UPE framework, but also for the supervision of  both 
public and private schools. Although private schools do not receive 
financial aid from the government, they still write the same exams 
and their performance contributes to the ranking of  local government 
performance in a particular district. While schools depend on the 
district, local governments depend on the central government for 
funds. The UPE programme funds come with an expenditure formula 
for every district. Most of  the education expenditure is earmarked 
for teacher salaries. District councils are mandated to mobilise local 
resources to supplement the regular flow of  funds from the central 
government in order to support other activities. However, in both Nebbi 
and Arua districts local government contributes under 5 per cent of  
the total budget. The responsibility for providing development funds 
remains with central government and other stakeholders.
Also, the role of  district councils in ensuring improved performance 
in service delivery appears to be quite limited in both districts. In 
Arua, district officials try to do so by organising community meetings 
to discuss issues related to the delivery of  primary education (which, 
according to some respondents in Arua’s education department, is 
improving the quality of  education through parents’ commitment to 
education), while in Nebbi the district meets the challenge of  having few 
inspectors by hiring former head teachers as assessors and inspectors. 
Finally, both districts have developed education bylaws, but they seem to 
have little role in ensuring the implementation and quality of  primary 
education in the public schools studied here.
An interesting indicator of  the poor quality of  primary education 
in public schools managed by local governments is the fact that the 
children of  district government staff and even public school teachers 
attend private schools. A respondent in Arua local government echoed 
the views of  many when he explained, ‘Our children are not in 
government schools. We sell the wrong thing to the people. There are 
many children of  the poor who are brighter than our children but are 
condemned to this [UPE school] education’. There is a sense of  regret 
among government officials that they are aware UPE is not working 
well, and yet, they have to continue to present it as a great policy to 
enable all children access to education. A respondent from the civil 
society sector in Nebbi expressed a similar sentiment when he shared, 
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‘Teachers in UPE schools send their children to private schools. They 
are better off having their children taught by private schools. They are 
sure their children will pass’.
According to various respondents in the two districts, public schools 
perform poorly in both districts due to a wide range of  factors, which 
include lack of  teaching materials, late arrival of  government funds, 
head teachers seldom being in school to supervise teaching, late 
arrival and early departure of  teachers, and infrastructure challenges 
ranging from lack of  classrooms and desks to pit latrines. Although the 
availability of  UPE has provided poor children with access to education, 
it has also created marked disparities between the educational quality 
that poor children in these schools receive, and that offered in private 
schools that are attended by the children of  families with higher 
incomes (Uwezo Uganda 2016).
These facts illustrate the current poor quality of  public education and 
the failure of  local government officials to fix the broken school system. 
Interviews provided strong evidence of  the fact that most stakeholders 
shifted responsibility in terms of  where the blame for poor delivery lies. 
Teachers face most of  the blame from other stakeholders, while teachers 
in turn blame local government limited capacity and parents’ lack of  
commitment to the education of  their children. Yet, Arua District has 
a comfortable lead on Nebbi on primary education outcomes, as per 
the 2013/14 scorecard assessment rankings (ACODE 2014), despite 
the many similarities identified here. What explains Arua’s better 
performance? I use evidence from my interviews to identify the main 
features that can help explain this.
5 Variations in education performance: the nature of partnerships
A comparative analysis of  Arua and Nebbi local government 
performance is a useful exercise to reveal how despite most local 
governments facing similar challenges and having similar powers and 
mandates (including local governments that share geography and 
history), varied outcomes are possible largely due to external factors 
such as donor interventions, and other partnerships. While in both 
Nebbi and Arua, local government state schools performed almost 
similarly, I argue that the role of  donors and the nature of  public–
private partnerships significantly account for variations in overall 
educational outcomes. The level of  involvement by donors and private 
sector investment is crucial for success.
5.1 How central government dependency accounts for variations at the 
district level
At the district level, the degree of  dependence on central government is 
crucial for investment in education. It is also important to note that the 
capacity to deliver implies that funds directly transferred from central 
government are likely to achieve their aim. This comparison starts with 
the understanding of  the financial situation in both local governments 
as seen in Table 1.
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By observation of  the two local governments, we can see that Arua has 
many business enterprises, and thus greater revenue mobilisation but 
its share of  local revenue is less than 1 per cent. This, local government 
officials argue, is because the Uganda Revenue Authority collects most 
of  the revenue. The little that is collected within the local governments 
goes to support council activities rather than services like education, 
which therefore remain dependent on central government transfers. In 
Arua, a senior local government official expressed his dilemma:
Most of  the lucrative sources of  revenue are taken up by the central government, 
they are collected by the Uganda Revenue Authority [URA]. Most of  the taxes 
are collected by it. What is left for the local government is very hard to collect. 
At some times we even said, now since URA is specialised in revenue collection, 
why don’t they collect 100 per cent?
Studies have in the past indicated the erosion of  local government 
autonomy with the abolition of  graduated tax (Golooba-Mutebi 2006). 
Although local governments had the mandate to levy tax, central 
government abolished graduated tax, draining districts of  the most 
reliable source of  revenue. In addition to market dues, other sources 
include trading licences (largely collected by the urban councils), 
licensing which is more of  a regulatory service, and thus limited as a 
source of  funds. Fees for a limited number of  billboard advertisements 
are another potential source, but if  they fall under road reserve, Uganda 
National Roads Authority collects it. The local service tax is a more 
reliable source but very small. Another revenue source is council court 
fees, but these provide revenue for the court system in most cases. In 
short, multiple state agencies collect revenue from districts.
Local governments are thus vessels through which resources from 
central government flow for specific activities, rather than units with 
power. The real question is whether local governments have any liberty 
to plan for activities. In the case of  primary education, most of  the 
Table 1 Revenue sources and education allocation for Nebbi and Arua districts for 
the financial years 2012/13–2014/15 (Shillings 000)
Revenue source
Total revenue 
(Nebbi)
Percentage of 
total
Total revenue 
(Arua)
Percentage of 
total
Central 
government
73,017,274 95.7 133,880,657 91.9
Local revenue 998,758 1.3 1,302,488 0.9
Donor funding 2,309,702 3.0 10,485,589 7.2
Total annual 
budget
76,325,734 100.0 145,668,734 100.0
Education 
allocation
38,940,425 51 78,162,787 53.7
Source Local government budget estimates, MoFPED.4
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grants are conditional and allow little flexibility. Central government 
controls, even though there may be good reasons for such controls, 
impact negatively on service delivery. The dysfunctional nature of  
decentralisation is demonstrable through the practice of  recruitment 
of  teachers or making capital expenditures – for a district to recruit 
teachers or buy a vehicle, they need clearance from the central 
government. This is in line with what ACODE (2014) found, that 
dependence on the central government and inability to generate local 
revenues are highlighted by 75 per cent of  the districts.
5.2 How donor involvement accounts for variations at the district level
Currently, local governments are overly dependent on the central 
government for resources, particularly conditional grants. One main 
reason is that the central government and the donors are not fully 
convinced that local governments are capable of  managing large 
amounts of  funds (Saito 2003: 145).
Although Nebbi has a larger contribution of  local revenue (1.3 per 
cent), Arua’s dependence on central government is lower due to 
contribution from donors (7.2 per cent) while that of  Nebbi stands 
at 3 per cent (see Table 1). Whereas the difference appears small as 
a percentage of  a district’s total budget allocation to education, it is 
substantial in absolute terms. Donor criteria for more involvement in 
Arua is not explicit, but may be connected to the fact that it is a regional 
centre, and as such, has more NGOs and thus more capacity to deliver 
on funds outside the local government structure.
Donor contribution differentials, as seen in Table 1, boosted the capacity 
of  Arua local government through budget support but also through 
direct investment in schools. Arua local government department of  
education, as a result, has developed higher capacity in terms of  human 
capital and infrastructure. This is not the case in Nebbi, which has 
continued to face both human resource and infrastructural challenges for 
several years. This was corroborated by staff in the education department 
in Nebbi, who lamented, ‘[A]ll our vehicles are now grounded in the 
garage. We have no means of  transport for supervision and inspection’. 
This is attributed to a ban on departments purchasing vehicles. Sitting 
at the Arua District local government headquarters, I observed at least 
three vehicles for the education sector, procured through non-state funds, 
and none of  the interviews in Arua identified such challenges.
The quality of  administrative staff accounts for differences in 
performance and creation of  effective organisational culture, and 
this too was connected to the role of  donors and a regular flow of  
funds by respondents. Arua District has experienced a considerable 
level of  continuity and consistency in political and administrative 
leadership. Most members of  council had been there for over a decade 
and understood the problems of  their area well. On the other hand, 
Nebbi faced staff shortages, but was unable to recruit new staff due 
to a pending wage bill. Within Nebbi’s district council, respondents 
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suggested that these administrative problems were not helped by limited 
donor intervention. For instance, two members argued:
The problem with Nebbi is that we have limited NGOs, limited stakeholders 
to support Nebbi. We have only the NGO Forum and now we have UNICEF. 
The major one is UNICEF. And UNICEF mainly supports us with sports.
UNICEF cannot do it alone, not even the government, not even the councillors. 
At least I would suggest that if  other NGOs or donors could come around, it 
would be fairer. It is becoming too big for UNICEF alone to handle it.
These revelations, by a male and female member of  council, all 
underscore the important role of  donors in improving capacity 
of  the district to better deliver educational outcomes. This is also 
acknowledged in the literature. For instance, Boko notes:
The contribution of  international donor agencies to the development 
of  local communities in Africa must not be underestimated. For 
though they have gained the political power for self-determination, 
the vast majority of  local communities in Africa lack the financial 
resources to assert that power, making financial and technical support 
from international development organisations a very important 
source of  development action (2002: 61).
In the case of  district performance, given the current dependence on 
central government for funding of  programmes, re-centralisation of  
functions, compounded by creation of  districts that are not viable, 
suggest that indeed contributions of  international donor agencies cannot 
be underestimated. Donor support fills capacity and budgetary gaps, 
especially when channelled through districts in specific areas of  need.
5.3 How private sector involvement accounts for variations at the district level
Arua also performs better overall because of  the extent of  private 
sector investment in education. Arua has several private schools, which 
contribute to the better performance and ranking of  the district. Nebbi 
has far fewer private schools that can contribute in a similar way. As one 
respondent in Nebbi put it:
If  you are talking about government-aided schools, I don’t think Arua is doing 
any better. The difference is, Arua has so many private schools. So when they 
say Arua has got so many first grades, nobody says government schools has got 
this, private schools has got this. It’s just like Zombo [neighbouring district] 
here. Zombo gets more first grades than Nebbi because of  one private school. But 
if  you are talking about government schools, then it’s all the same. People don’t 
look at which schools are private schools and which schools are public.
Respondents in Arua District local government agreed with this 
position. A recent analysis that deals with the country as a whole, the 
2016 Uwezo report, also suggests that the role of  the private sector in a 
district’s performance in education cannot be ignored considering that 
district rankings take into account private schools as well. It reveals that:
120 | Maractho Local Governments and Primary Education in Uganda
Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’
… for P.3 to P.7 pupils, attending private schools boosts their 
competence over their government school peers 17 percentage points 
in English, 10 percentage points in mathematics and six percentage 
points in local languages (Nassaka 2016: 16).
There are, therefore, large attainment inequalities between pupils 
attending private schools and those enrolled in schools run by local 
government.
6 Local government and primary education delivery: implications for policy
Our two cases show that contrary to claims that local governments 
have power as per the legal frameworks, districts still largely depend on 
central government for the delivery of  primary education under their 
mandate. Local government contribution in terms of  local revenue is 
non-existent due to the limited collection of  local revenue, despite the 
existence of  taxable private businesses in these districts. And although 
there is an argument that decades of  reform efforts, capacity building 
and huge donor spending appear to have brought little improvement in 
service delivery, where direct donor involvement in schools is available, 
primary education performance is significantly better. The larger donor 
contribution to Arua’s local government – as compared to Nebbi – gives 
it an added advantage in improving performance, not only by building 
local level capacity, but also by reducing its degree of  dependence on 
central government.
The ad hoc nature of  partnerships between local governments and other 
stakeholders has benefited some local governments at the expense of  
others. Both private sector investment and donor monies flow to certain 
districts, often the same ones because of  capacity issues, and not to 
others. This calls for greater coordination among central government, 
local government, the private sector and donors in defining where 
donors and other partners are most needed depending on existing 
challenges, and so that available funds can be distributed more evenly 
across districts. Results of  the 2016 Uwezo survey show that the ten 
best performing districts are all located in central and south-western 
Uganda while the ten worst performing districts are all located in the 
East, North and West Nile regions. If  this continues, not only will 
inequalities increase between poorer and less poor children attending 
public and private schools respectively, but also regional inequalities are 
bound to become worse. There is a need for a comprehensive review of  
the powers of  local governments and the services they can realistically 
deliver in line with the resources they can mobilise. While many of  their 
powers remain as stipulated in the constitution, the context has greatly 
changed in the face of  liberalisation, privatisation and government 
re-centralisation of  some functions.
The promise of  decentralisation was to create an effective system 
of  service delivery, where local governments would bring services 
closer to the people and infuse local populations with the power 
of  popular participation. But this does not seem to have happened 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’ 109–124 | 121
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
in Uganda. Based on the analysis presented in this article, I draw 
three broad conclusions, which manifest the difference between 
decentralisation rhetoric and reality. First, that there is a disconnect 
between decentralisation as policy and as practice, as demonstrated by 
local government delivery of  primary education. Second, with central 
government controlling at least 95 per cent of  the financing of  districts, 
development priorities are still decided by central government, through 
pre-determined indicative figures to guide budgeting. Local governments 
have little power and freedom to decide what their priorities might be 
and even if  they do, even less power to act upon them. Third, because 
local governments fail to achieve meaningful local revenue collection, the 
quality of  the delivery of  public services suffers, as central government 
disbursements are, by themselves, inadequate and local governments 
have minimal capacity to contribute. The case of  West Nile suggests 
that the performance of  districts in delivering services such as education 
has much to do with donor presence and the extent of  involvement by 
the private sector. Local governments that succeed do so through the 
strength of  partnerships with donors and the private sector.
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1 The Ugandan Primary Education cycle runs from Primary One (P.1) 
to Primary Seven (P.7) when pupils write the national primary leaving 
examination from which they join secondary education, which runs 
for six years.
2 Net Enrolment Ratio (number of  primary school children aged 
six–twelve years to the number of  children of  the same age range 
in the population); completion rate (ratio of  total number of  pupils 
who successfully complete the last year of  primary education); and 
Primary Leaving Examination (PLE) Performance Index (number of  
candidates that sat for PLE examination multiplied by the weight of  
the highest grade) (MoES 2013).
3 All interviews took place in May 2016, either in Nebbi or in Arua.
4 Ministry of  Finance, Planning and Economic Development,  
www.finance.go.ug.
References
ACODE (2014) Local Government Councils Score-Card Assessment Report 
(Vol. 64), Kampala: Advocates Coalition for Development and 
Environment, www.acode-u.org/LGScorecards.html (accessed 
6 February 2017)
AFARD (2011) West Nile Development Initiative (WENDI) Transforming 
Livelihoods Annual Report, December, Nebbi: Agency for Accelerated 
Rural Development, www.afard.net/publications/general/121-2011-
wendi-annual-report?formart=html (accessed 6 February 2017) 
122 | Maractho Local Governments and Primary Education in Uganda
Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’
Boko, S.H. (2002) Decentralisation and Reform in Africa, Boston MA: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Buwembo, J. (2016) ‘Reality Check: A Damning Report that should 
Force a Rethink of  20-Year Universal Education Strategy’, The East 
African Newspaper, 8–14 October
Crook, R.C. (2010) ‘Rethinking Civil Service Reform in Africa: “Islands 
of  Effectiveness” and Organisational Commitment’, Commonwealth and  
Comparative Politics 48.4: 479–504, DOI:10.1080/14662043.2010.522037,  
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14662043.2010.522037 
(accessed 1 February 2017)
Golooba-Mutebi, F. (2006) ‘Politics and Local Government in Uganda’, 
in F. Saito (ed.), Foundations of  Local Governance: Decentralisation in 
Comparative Perspective, Seta, Otsu: Physica-Verlag
Golooba-Mutebi, F. (2004) ‘Reassessing Popular Participation in 
Uganda’, Public Administration and Development 24.4: 289–304
GoU (Government of  Uganda) (2013) Principles of  Service Delivery in 
Uganda’s Local Governments: Handbook, Kampala: Ministry of  Local 
Government
GoU (Government of  Uganda) (1997) Local Government Act, Entebbe: 
Government Printery, www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-
act/243 (accessed 6 February 2017)
GoU (Government of  Uganda) (1995) Uganda Constitution, Entebbe: 
Government Printery, www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-
act/0/ (accessed 6 February 2017)
Green, E. (2013) The Rise and Fall of  Decentralisation in Contemporary 
Uganda, UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2013/078, Helsinki: United 
Nations University
Green, E. (2010) ‘Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda’, 
Studies in Comparative International Development 45.1: 83–103
Karibwije, D. (2005) Uganda Districts: Information Handbook, Expanded 
Edition 2005–2006, Kampala: Fountain Publishers
Katono, W. (2007) ‘Factors Affecting Service Delivery in Decentralisation 
in Mukono District’, in D. Asiimwe and B.N. Musisi (eds), 
Decentralisation and Transformation of  Governance in Uganda, Kampala: 
Fountain Publishers
MoES (2013) The Education and Sports Sector Annual Performance Report FY 
2012/13, Kampala: Ministry of  Education and Sports 
Mukunya, F. (2007) ‘The Decentralisation of  Uganda’s Primary 
Education’, in D. Asiimwe and B.N. Musisi (eds), Decentralisation and 
Transformation of  Governance in Uganda, Kampala: Fountain Publishers
Namukasa, I. (2007) ‘Decentralisation and Education in Uganda’, 
Comparative and International Education 36.1: 98
Nassaka, F. (2016) ‘What’s Wrong in Education? Sixth Uwezo Survey 
Finds Learning Outcomes Consistently Low’, The Independent 
Magazine 450, 23–29 December
Nkalubo, A. (2007) ‘Community Participation and Decentralised 
Governance in Uganda’, in D. Asiimwe and B.N. Musisi (eds), 
Decentralisation and Transformation of  Governance in Uganda, Kampala: 
Fountain Publishers
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’ 109–124 | 123
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Saito, F. (2006) ‘Possibility of  Creating a Deliberative Solution 
in Uganda’, in F. Saito (ed.), Foundations of  Local Governance: 
Decentralisation in Comparative Perspective, Seta, Otsu: Physica-Verlag
Saito, F. (2003) Decentralisation and Development Partnerships: Lessons from 
Uganda, Tokyo: Springer-Verlag
Ssemakula, V. (1996) ‘Rakai District in Development: Consequences 
of  Decentralisation’, in L. Villadsen and F. Lubanga (eds), Democratic 
Decentralisation in Uganda: A New Approach to Local Governance, 
Kampala: Fountain Publishers
Steffensen, J. (2006) ‘Local Government Organisation and Finance: 
Uganda’, in Anwar Shah (ed.), Local Governance in Developing Countries, 
Washington DC: World Bank
Uwezo Uganda (2016) Are Our Children Learning? Sixth Annual Learning 
Assessment Report, www.twaweza.org/go/uwezo-uganda-2015-ala 
(accessed 6 February 2017)
Uwezo Uganda (2011) Are Our Children Learning? Annual Learning 
Assessment Report, www.uwezo.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/
UG_2011_AnnualAssessmentReport.pdf  (accessed 1 February 2017)
Widmalm, S. (2008) Decentralisation, Corruption and Social Capital: From 
India to the West, New Delhi: Sage Publications
This page is intentionally left blank
Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’
124 | Maractho Local Governments and Primary Education in Uganda
